The Aristotelian syllogistic cannot account for the validity of many inferences involving relational facts. In this paper, we investigate the prospects for providing a relational syllogistic. We identify several fragments based on (a) whether negation is permitted on all nouns, including those in the subject of a sentence; and (b) whether the subject noun phrase may contain a relative clause. The logics we present are extensions of the classical syllogistic, and we pay special attention to the question of whether reductio ad absurdum is needed. Thus our main goal is to derive results on the existence (or non-existence) of syllogistic proof systems for relational fragments. We also determine the computational complexity of all our fragments.
direct syllogistic system for this fragment that is sound and refutation-complete (i.e. becomes complete if reductio ad absurdum is allowed as a single, final step). We then consider indirect syllogistic systems-i.e. those in which the rule of reductio ad absurdum may be employed at any point during the derivation. We show that-unless PTime=NPTime-there is no direct syllogistic system that is sound and refutation-complete for the fragment R * ; however, we do provide an indirect syllogistic system that is sound and complete for this fragment. Finally, we show that neither R † nor R * † has even an indirect syllogistic system that is sound and complete. We also obtain results on the computational complexity of determining validity in the above fragments, and show how these results are related to the existence of sound and complete proof-systems (of various kinds) for the fragments in question. Specifically, we show that the problem of determining the validity of sequents in any of the fragments S, S † or R is NLogSpace-complete; the problem of determining the validity of sequents in the fragment R * is co-NPTime-complete; and the problem of determining the validity of sequents in either of the fragments R † or R * † is ExpTime-complete. Thus, although we are heartened to learn of interest in relational syllogisms going back to de Morgan, our contribution should not be read as a historical reconstruction. It is a product of our own time, different from de Morgan's in both motivation and outcome.
Preliminaries

Some syllogistic fragments
The fragments S and S † Fix a countably infinite set P. We may assume P to contain various English common count-nouns such as man, animal etc. A unary atom is an element of P; a unary literal is an expression of either of the forms p orp, where p is a unary atom. A unary literal is called positive if it is a unary atom; otherwise, negative. We use the (possibly decorated) variables o, p, q to range over unary atoms, and l, m, n to range over unary literals. With these conventions, an S-formula is an expression of any of the forms
We provide English glosses for S-formulas as follows:
Some p is a q ∃(p,q) Some p is not a q.
Note that S contains the formulas ∃(p, q) and ∀(p,q), which are not glossed in (3); however, the semantics given below ensure that these formulas are logically equivalent to ∃(q,p) and ∀(q, p), respectively. We may regard S as the language of the traditional syllogistic. The syntax for S given above suggests a natural generalization. An S † -formula is an expression of either of the forms ∃(l, m), ∀(l, m).
We provide English glosses for S † -formulas in the same way as for S, except that we sometimes require negated subjects:
Some non-p is not a q ∀(p, q) Every non-p is a q.
We may regard S † the extension of the traditional syllogistic with noun-level negation.
The fragments R and R † Now fix a countably infinite set R, disjoint from P. We may assume R to contain various English transitive verbs such as kill, admire etc. A binary atom is an element of R; a binary literal is an expression of either of the forms r orr, where r is a binary atom. A binary literal is called positive if it is a binary atom; otherwise, negative. We use the (possibly decorated) variables r, s to range over binary atoms, and t to range over binary literals. With these conventions, a c-term is an expression of any of the forms l, ∃(p, t), ∀(p, t).
Thus, all literals are, by definition, c-terms. We use the variables c, d to range over c-terms. With this convention, an R-formula is an expression of any of the forms ∃(p, c),
Thus, all S-formulas are, by definition, R-formulas.
We gloss (non-literal) c-terms using complex noun phrases, as follows:
∃(q, r) thing which rs some q ∀(q, r) thing which rs every q (7) ∃(q,r) thing which does not r every q ∀(q,r) thing which rs no q.
And we gloss R-formulas involving such c-terms accordingly, thus:
∀(p, ∃(q, r)) Every p rs some q ∀(p, ∃(q,r)) No p rs every q ∃(p, ∃(q, r)) Some p rs some q ∃(p, ∃(q,r)) Some p does not r every q ∀(p, ∀(q, r)) Every p rs every q ∀(p, ∀(q,r)) No p rs any q ∃(p, ∀(q, r)) Some p rs every q ∃(p, ∀(q,r)) Some p rs no q.
In these glosses, quantifiers in subjects are assumed to have wide scope; those in objects, narrow scope. Also, the not in Some p does not r every q is assumed to scope over the direct object. Again, formulas of the forms ∃(c, p) and ∀(c,p), which are not glossed here, will turn out to be equivalent to formulas which are. We may regard R as the language of the relational syllogistic.
Let us now extend R with noun-level negation just as we did with S. An e-term is an expression of any of the forms l, ∃(l, t), ∀(l, t).
We gloss non-literal e-terms along the lines of (7) and (8) , but with (possibly) negated direct objects, for example:
∀(q, r) thing which rs every non-q ∀(q,r) thing which rs no non-q.
(Another way to gloss the latter term would be thing which only rs qs.) Thus, all c-terms are, by definition, e-terms. We use the variables e, f to range over e-terms. With this convention, an R † -formula is an expression of any of the forms ∃(l, e), ∃(e, l), ∀(l, e), ∀(e, l),
with the obvious English glosses. Note however that noun-level negation may be required, both in subjects and direct-objects:
∃(p, ∀(q, r)) Some non-p rs every non-q.
We may regard R † as the extension of the relational syllogistic with noun-level negation.
The fragments R * and R * †
The reader may have noticed that neither R nor R † can express the conclusion of Argument (1) . We now rectify this matter by introducing two additional fragments which can.
It will be convenient to extend the 'bar'-notation (as inp andr) to all eterms. If l =p is a negative unary literal, then we takel to denote p; and similarly for binary literals. If e is an e-term of the form ∀(l, t), we denote byē the corresponding e-term ∃(l,t); if e is an e-term of the form ∃(l, t), we denote byē the corresponding e-term ∀(l,t). Thus, for all e-terms e, we haveē = e.
Recalling that a c-term c is an expression of any of the forms l, ∃(p, t) or ∀(p, t), we call c positive if the literal l or t is positive; otherwise, negative. Evidently, if c is a positive c-term, thenc is a negative c-term, and vice-versa. We now define an R * -formula to be an expression of any of the forms
where c + ranges over positive c-terms and d over all c-terms (positive or negative). These forms may then be glossed by combining the glosses (3) and (7) in the obvious way. Thus, for example, the conclusion of Argument (1) may be formalized in R * as ∀(∃(man, kill), ∃(animal, kill)) Everything which kills a man (is a thing which) kills an animal.
It is straightforward to check that, in providing English glosses for R * -formulas, noun-level negation (i.e. expressions such as non-man) is not required. The study of R * is motivated in part by its close connection to the system described in McAllester and Givan [10] , and in part by the fact that, from both a prooftheoretic and complexity-theoretic point of view, it occupies an intermediate position, in a sense that will be made precise below.
We come finally to the most general of the fragments studied here. Recalling that the variables e and f range over e-terms, an R * † -formula is an expression of either of the forms ∃(e, f ), ∀(e, f ).
These formulas receive the obvious glosses, for example:
syllogistic with noun-negation R relational syllogistic R † relational syllogistic with noun-negation R * relational syllogistic with complex subjects R * † relational syllogistic with complex subjects and noun-negation Figure 1 : The six syllogistic fragments: S, S † , R, R † , R * and R * † . ∀(∃(animal, kill), ∃(man, kill)) Everything which kills a non-animal (is a thing which) kills a non-man.
Expression
We may regard R * † as the result of extending R * with noun-level negation. We denote the set of S-formulas simply by S, and similarly for S † , R, R † , R * and R * † . Many of the results established below apply to all of these fragments. Accordingly, we say that a syllogistic fragment is any of the fragments S, S † , R, R † , R * or R * † , and we use the variable F to range over the syllogistic fragments. Fig. 1 gives an overview of the syllogistic fragments, and Fig. 2 a quick reference guide to their syntax.
It will be convenient to extend the bar-notation to formulas. If ϕ is an R * † -formula of the form ∀(e, f ), we denote byφ the R * † -formula ∃(e,f ); if ϕ is an R * † -formula of the form ∃(e, f ), we denote byφ the R * † -formula ∀(e,f ). It is easy to verify that,φ = ϕ, and that, for any syllogistic fragment F , ϕ ∈ F impliesφ ∈ F.
Semantics We now provide semantics for the fragment R * † (and hence for any syllogistic fragment). A structure A is a triple A, {p A } p∈P , {r A } r∈R , where A is a non-empty set, p A ⊆ A, for every p ∈ P, and r A ⊆ A 2 , for every r ∈ R. The set A is called the domain of A. Given a structure A, we extend the maps p → p A and r → r A to all e-terms by settinḡ
We define the truth-relation |= between structures and R * † -formulas by declaring A |= ∀(e, f ) if and only if e A ⊆ f A , and A |= ∃(e, f ) if and only if e A ∩f A = ∅. If Θ is a set of formulas, we write A |= Θ if, for all θ ∈ Θ, A |= θ. Of course, this defines the truth-relation for formulas of any syllogistic fragment F .
A formula θ is satisfiable if there exists A such that A |= θ; a set of formulas Θ is satisfiable if there exists A such that A |= Θ. If, for all structures A, A |= Θ implies A |= θ, we write Θ |= θ. We take it as uncontroversial that Θ |= θ constitutes a rational reconstruction of the pre-theoretic judgment that a conclusion θ may be validly inferred from premises Θ. For example, the valid argument Some artist is a beekeeper Every artist is a carpenter No beekeeper is a dentist Some carpenter is not a dentist corresponds to the valid sequent of S-formulas:
∀(beekeeper, dentist)} |= ∃(carpenter, dentist). (13) Likewise, the valid argument We follow modern practice in taking universal quantification not to carry existential commitment: thus {∀(p, q)} |= ∃(p, q).
Absurdity, negation and identifications A simple check shows that, for any structure A and any e-term e,ē A = A \ e A ; hence, A |= ∃(e,ē). We refer to a formula of this form as an absurdity. Even the smallest syllogistic fragment, S, contains absurdities, namely, those of the form ∃(p,p). Where the fragment F is clear from context, we write ⊥ indifferently to denote any absurdity in F .
For any structure A and any R * † -formula ϕ, A |= ϕ if and only if A |=φ. Also, ϕ andφ belong to the same syllogistic fragments. Thus, if F is a syllogistic fragment and ϕ an F -formula, we may regardφ as the negation of ϕ.
For any structure A and any e-terms e and f , A |= ∃(e, f ) if and only if A |= ∃(f, e). Also, these formulas belong to the same syllogistic fragments. In the sequel, therefore, we identify such pairs of formulas, silently transforming one to the other as necessary. Similarly, for the pair of formulas ∀(e, f ) and ∀(f ,ē). These identifications make no essential difference to the results derived below on syllogistic proof-systems; however, they greatly simplify their presentation and analysis.
Syllogistic rules and reductio ad absurdum
Let F be a syllogistic fragment. A derivation relation |∼ in F is a subset of P(F ) × F, where P(F ) is the power set of F . For readability, we write Θ |∼ θ instead of Θ, θ ∈ |∼. We say that |∼ is sound if Θ |∼ θ implies Θ |= θ, and complete (for F ) if Θ |= θ implies Θ |∼ θ. A set Θ of F -formulas is inconsistent (with respect to |∼) if Θ |∼ ⊥ for some absurdity ⊥ ∈ F; otherwise, consistent. A weakening of completeness called refutation-completeness will prove important in the sequel: |∼ is refutation-complete if all unsatisfiable sets Θ are inconsistent. Completeness trivially implies refutation-completeness, but not conversely. We are primarily interested in derivation relations induced by two different sorts of deductive system: direct syllogistic systems and indirect syllogistic systems. These we now proceed to define.
Direct syllogistic systems Let F be a syllogistic fragment. We employ the following terminology. A syllogistic rule (sometimes, simply: rule) in F is a pair Θ/θ, where Θ is a finite set (possibly empty) of F -formulas, and θ an F -formula. We call Θ the antecedents of the rule, and θ its consequent. The rule Θ/θ is sound if Θ |= θ. We generally display rules in 'natural-deduction' style. For example,
where p, q and o are unary atoms, are syllogistic rules in S, corresponding to the traditional syllogisms Darii and Ferio, respectively. A substitution is a function g = g 1 ∪ g 2 , where g 1 : P → P and g 2 : R → R. If θ is an F -formula, denote by g(θ) the F -formula which results by replacing any atom (unary or binary) in θ by its image under g, and similarly for sets of formulas. An instance of a syllogistic rule Θ/θ is the syllogistic rule g(Θ)/g(θ), where g is a substitution.
Syllogistic rules which differ only with respect to re-naming of unary or binary atoms will be informally regarded as identical, because they have the same instances. Thus, the letters p, q and o in (15) function, in effect, as variables ranging over unary atoms. It is often convenient to display syllogistic rules using variables ranging over other types of expressions, understanding that these are just more compact ways of writing finite collections of syllogistic rules in the official sense. For example, the two rules (15) may be more compactly written
where p and q range over unary atoms, but l ranges over unary literals.
Fix a syllogistic fragment F , and let X be a set of syllogistic rules in F . Define ⊢ X to be the smallest derivation relation in F satisfying:
It is simple to show that the derivation relation ⊢ X is sound if and only if each rule in X is sound. Informally, we imagine chaining together instances of the rules in X to construct derivations, in the obvious way; and we refer to the resulting proof system as the direct syllogistic system defined by X. We generally display derivations in natural-deduction style. Thus, for example, if X is any rule set containing (D1), the derivation
which, given the soundness of (D1), entails the validity (13) . Notice, incidentally, that the first application of (D1) in the above derivation depends on the silent identification of ∃(p, q) and ∃(q, p). In the sequel, we reason freely about derivations in order to establish properties of derivation relations.
Derivation relations defined by direct proof-systems are easily seen to have polynomial-time complexity.
Lemma 2.1. Let F be a syllogistic fragment, and X a finite set of syllogistic rules in F . The problem of determining whether Θ ⊢ X θ, for a given set of F -formulas Θ and F -formula θ, is in PTime.
Proof. Let Σ be the set of all atoms (unary or binary) occurring in Θ ∪ {θ}, together with one additional binary atom r. We first observe that, if there is a derivation of θ from Θ using the rules X, then there is such a derivation involving only the atoms occurring in Σ. For, given any derivation of θ from Θ, uniformly replace any unary atom that does not occur in Θ ∪ {θ} with one that does. Similarly, uniformly replace any binary atom which does not occur in Θ ∪ {θ} with one which does (or with r in case Θ ∪ {θ} contains no binary atoms). This process obviously leaves us with a derivation of θ from Θ, using the rules X.
To prove the lemma, let the the total number of symbols occurring in Θ ∪ {θ} be n. Certainly, |Σ| n. Let X comprise k 1 proof-rules, each of which contains at most k 2 atoms (unary or binary). The number of rule instances involving only atoms in Σ is bounded by p(n) = k 1 n k2 . Hence, we need never consider derivations with 'depth' greater than p(n). Let Θ i be the set of formulas involving only the atoms in Σ, and derivable from Θ using a derivation of depth i or less (0 i p(n)). Evidently, |Θ i | |Θ| + p(n). It is then straightforward to compute the successive Θ i in total time bounded by a polynomial function of n.
Indirect syllogistic systems In addition to syllogistic rules, we consider the traditional rule of reductio ad absurdum (RAA), which allows us to derive a proposition ϕ (in some syllogistic fragment) by first assumingφ and deriving an absurdity. Again, we display this rule, in natural-deduction-style, as
The interpretation is as follows: if an absurdity has been derived from the set of premises Φ together with the premiseφ, then ϕ may be derived from the premises Φ alone. The premiseφ may be used several times (including zero) in the derivation of the absurdity; moreover, Φ is allowed to containφ. We say that the (zero or more) bracketed instances of the premiseφ have been discharged by application of (RAA). The numerical superscript i simply allows us to keep track of which application of (RAA) was responsible for the discharge of which (instances of a) premise.
Fix a syllogistic fragment F , and let X be a set of syllogistic rules in F . Define X to be the smallest derivation relation in F satisfying:
2. if {θ 1 , . . . , θ n }/θ is a rule in X, g a substitution, Θ = Θ 1 ∪ · · · ∪ Θ n , and
It is again simple to show that X is sound if and only if each rule in X is sound.
Informally, we imagine chaining together instances of the rules in X and the rule (RAA) to form indirect derivations in the obvious way; and we refer to the resulting proof system as the indirect syllogistic system defined by X. We generally display indirect derivations in natural-deduction style, as the following example illustrates. First, consider the (evidently sound) syllogistic rules:
Here, as usual, o, p and q range over unary atoms, t over binary literals and c over c-terms. In addition, we generalize the rule (D1) given above so that the variable l (ranging over literals) may be replaced by the variable c (ranging over c-terms). Then we have the following indirect derivation.
Here, two instances of the premise ∃(artist, beekeeper) have been discharged by the final application of (RAA). This derivation establishes that, if X is any set of rules containing (D3), (∀∀) and (D1) (generalized as indicated), then {∀(artist, ∀(artist, hate)), ∀(beekeeper, ∃(beekeeper, hate))} X ∀(artist, beekeeper).
Bearing in mind that ∃(beekeeper, hate) = ∀(beekeeper, hate), and given the soundness of the syllogistic rules employed, this entails the validity (14) .
It is important to realize that (RAA) is not itself a syllogistic rule. In particular, an application of (RAA) in general decreases the set of premises of the derivations in which it features. As we shall see below, the special status of (RAA) is essential: indirect syllogistic systems are in general more powerful than direct syllogistic systems.
If ⊢ X is refutation-complete, then X is complete. For suppose Θ |= θ. Then Θ ∪ {θ} is unsatisfiable; hence, by the refutation-completeness of ⊢ X , Θ ∪ {θ} ⊢ X ⊥; hence, using a single, final application of (RAA), Θ X θ. We stress, however, that (RAA) is not in general restricted to the final step in an X -derivation; rather, it may be employed at any point, and any number of times. In particular, the reasoning of Lemma 2.1 fails: in Section 5 we present a set of syllogistic rules R * such that R * is co-NPTime-hard. We conclude this discussion by showing that indirect proof-systems yield a version of Lindenbaum's Lemma. Let F be any syllogistic fragment. We say that a set of F -formulas Θ is F -complete if, for every F -formula θ, either θ ∈ Θ orθ ∈ Θ. If the fragment F is clear from context, we say complete instead of Fcomplete; notice however that F -completeness of a set of formulas has nothing to do with the completeness of a derivation relation. Proof. Let (ϕ n ) n∈N enumerate the formulas of F . We define a sequence of consistent sets ∆ n as follows. Let ∆ 0 = Θ. For n 0, let
and let ∆ = n ∆ n . We show by induction that each ∆ n is consistent. For suppose ∆ n is consistent, but ∆ n+1 inconsistent. Then ∆ n ∪ {ϕ n } X ⊥, so that ∆ n Xφn using (RAA). In addition, ∆ n ∪ {φ n } X ⊥ ′ (where ⊥ ′ is some absurdity). We take a derivation establishing the latter assertion and replace each (undischarged) premiseφ with a derivation ofφ from ∆ n . This shows ∆ n to be inconsistent, a contradiction. Thus, ∆ n is consistent, for all n.
Since derivations are finite, ∆ is consistent. Obviously, ∆ is F -complete.
S and S † : direct systems
In the previous section, we defined our general notions, including the fragments S and S † . These are the simplest in our paper, coming without verbs. This section provides sound and complete syllogistic logics for them. Let S be the following set of rules, where p and q range over unary atoms, l over unary literals, and and ϕ, ψ over S-formulas.
Rules (D1) and (D3) we have met already (the latter in a rather more general form); Rules (D2) and (B) are new, but evidently versions of classical syllogisms. Rule (X) is the classical rule of ex falso quodlibet: from a contradiction, the reasoner may have anything he pleases [quodlibet] . This rule is not to be confused with (RAA): (X) is a syllogistic rule, in the technical sense of this paper; (RAA) is not. Rules (A), (T) and (I) have no classical counterparts. Rule (A) stems from the fact that if all p are non-p, then there are no p whatsoever; vacuously, then, all p are l. To see that (T) is needed, note that without it there would be no way to derive ∀(p, p) from the empty set of premises. Rule (I) is self-explanatory. We remark that Rule (D1) is actually redundant in this context. For consider any instance
is a positive literal, then, using the identification ∃(e, f ) = ∃(f, e), we may rewrite this instance as
, which is an instance of (D2). On the other hand, if l ′ =ō, then, using the identification ∀(e, f ) = ∀(f ,ē), we may re-write the instance as
, which is an instance of (D3). We retain Rule (D1) for ease of use, and to make the relationship to the system R introduced in Section 4.2 more transparent.
Turning now to the fragment S † , let S † comprise the following syllogistic rules, where l, m and n range over unary literals, and ϕ, ψ over S † -formulas.
The rules in S † are the natural generalizations of those in S to reflect the more liberal syntax of S † , but with two small changes: first, rules (D1)-(D3) have merged into a single rule (D); second, an extra rule (N) has been added. The soundness of (N) is due to the requirement that our structures have non-empty domains.
That S † really is an extension of S is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Any instance of a rule in S † which involves only formulas in the fragment S is an instance of a rule of S, and conversely.
Proof. We prove the first statement by considering the rules of S † one at a time. We illustrate here with Rule (D). Suppose that all formulas in some instance {∃(l, n), ∀(l, m)}/∃(m, n) of this rule are in S. If m is positive, then so is l (since ∀(l, m) ∈ S). In this case, our instance matches Rule (D2) in the system S. On the other hand, if m is negative, then n is positive (since ∃(m, n) ∈ S). We then use the identifications ∀(l, m) = ∀(m,l), ∃(l, n) = ∃(n, l), and ∃(m, n) = ∃(n, m), and re-write the rule-instance as {∃(n, l), ∀(m,l)}/∃(n, m), which (bearing in mind that n andm are unary atoms) matches Rule (D3) in the system S. The other rules are dealt with similarly. Note in particular that all instances of Rule (N) involve a formula lying outside the fragment S, so that the statement holds trivially for this rule. The second statement of the lemma is completely routine.
In view of Lemma 3.1, we have taken the liberty of using the same names-(B), (A), (T), (I) and (X)-for corresponding rules in S and S † . It is obvious that ⊢ S and ⊢ S † are sound. We now prove their completeness (for the fragments for S and S † , respectively). It is convenient to prove the completeness of ⊢ S † , and then to derive the result for ⊢ S as a special case.
Starting on the proof In the remainder of this section, then, a formula is an S † -formula unless otherwise stated. A universal formula is one of the form ∀(l, m); an existential formula is one of the form ∃(l, m). If A and B are structures with disjoint domains A and B, respectively, denote by A ∪ B the structure with domain A ∪ B and interpretations p A∪B = p A ∪ p B for any unary atom p. (Note that S † features only unary atoms.)
where Φ is a set of universal formulas, Ψ a set of existential formulas, and θ a formula.
1. If Φ ∪ Ψ is satisfiable and θ is universal, then Φ |= θ.
2. If Ψ = ∅ and θ is existential, then there exists ψ ∈ Ψ such that Φ∪{ψ} |= θ.
Proof. In each case, assume the contrary.
1. There exist structures A |= Φ ∪ Ψ and B |= Φ ∪θ. We may assume that
2. For every ψ ∈ Ψ, there exists a structure A ψ such that A ψ |= Φ ∪ {ψ,θ}. Again, we assume that the domains are pairwise disjoint. But
Choose a ∈l A , and let B be the structure obtained by restricting A to the singleton domain {a}. Then B |= Φ ∪ {θ}, a contradiction. A similar argument applies if Φ |= ∀(m, m).
We write Φ ⊢ BTA ϕ if there is a derivation in ⊢ S † of ϕ from Φ employing only the rules (B), (T) and (A). We call a set V of literals consistent if l ∈ V implies l ∈ V (otherwise inconsistent); we call V complete if l ∈ V impliesl ∈ V . Let Φ be a set of universal formulas and V a set of literals. Define S Φ to be the set of literals:
Lemma 3.3. Let Φ be a set of universal formulas and V a set of literals. Then
V Φ is Φ-closed, and V ⊆ V Φ .
Proof. Almost immediate, by rules (B) and (T).
Evidently, the union of any collection of Φ-closed sets of literals is Φ-closed.
Lemma 3.4. Let Φ be a set of universal formulas and V a set of literals. If
, we have a derivation from Φ . . . .
∀(l, m)
. . . .
as claimed. 
and define V = i V i . Thus, V is Φ-closed, complete and includes V 0 . We remark that, since V 0 ⊆ V i , V i is non-empty for all i 0. To show that V is consistent, suppose otherwise. Let i be the least natural number such that V i+1 is inconsistent. Hence, V i+1 = V i ∪ {l i+1 } Φ , and so by Lemma 3.4 there exist
Since V i is Φ-closed and consistent, l and l ′ cannot both be in V i , and so we may assume without loss of generality that l ′ =l i+1 , whence Φ ⊢ BTA ∀(l, l i+1 ). Now, either l ∈ V i or l =l i+1 . In the former case, we have l i+1 ∈ V i , because V i is Φ-closed; in the latter, let l ′′ be any literal in V i (which we know to be non-empty). Then the inference
Theorem 3.6. The derivation relation ⊢ S † is sound and complete for S † .
Proof. Soundness is routine. For the converse, let Θ be a set of S † -formulas and θ a S † -formula, and suppose Θ |= θ. By the compactness theorem for first-order logic, we may safely assume that Θ is finite. Suppose for the moment that Θ is satisfiable, and write Θ = Φ ∪ Ψ, where Φ is a set of universal formulas and Ψ a set of existential formulas. We consider three cases: (1) θ is universal; (2) θ is existential and Ψ is non-empty; and (3) θ is existential and Ψ is empty.
In the remainder of this proof, we simplify our notation to write ⊢ for ⊢ S † .
Then V 0 is non-empty and Φ-closed, by Lemma 3.3. We claim that V 0 is inconsistent. For suppose otherwise. By Lemma 3.5, let V be a consistent complete extension of V 0 , and define A to be the structure with singleton domain {a} given by
for every atom p. It is easily seen that A |= Φ ∪θ, a contradiction. So by Lemma 3.4, there exist literals l, l
By exchanging l and l ′ if necessary, we have two sub-cases: (17) simply asserts that Φ ⊢ θ. In sub-case (ii), we have one of the derivations from Φ . . . .
and so Φ ⊢ θ.
The set V 0 must be inconsistent. For otherwise, we can easily construct, using a parallel argument to that employed in Case (1), a structure A such that A |= Φ ∪ {ψ,θ}, contradicting the fact that Φ ∪ {ψ} |= θ. Hence, there exist literals l 1 , l 2 ∈ {l 0 , m 0 ,l} such that Φ ⊢ BTA ∀(l 1 ,l 2 ). If l 1 and l 2 are both in {l 0 , m 0 }, then Θ is unsatisfiable, contrary to hypothesis. So assume, without loss of generality, that l 2 =l. Thus, Φ ⊢ BTA ∀(l 1 , l), and we have the following possibilities:
In other words, we have proved:
Replacing l by m in the above argument yields, in exactly the same way:
Considering (18), we may assume, by transposing l 0 and m 0 if necessary, that Φ ⊢ ∀(l 0 , l). This leaves us with the two possibilities in (19) .
we have
if, on the other hand, Φ ⊢ ∀(l 0 , m), we have
Either way, Θ ⊢ θ, as required.
and Φ |= ∀(m, m). By Case (1), Φ ⊢ ∀(l, l) and Φ ⊢ ∀(m, m). Therefore, we have the derivation from Φ . . . .
and Θ ⊢ θ.
We have now shown that, for Θ satisfiable, Θ |= θ implies Θ ⊢ θ. It remains only to consider the case where Θ is unsatisfiable. If so, let Θ ′ ∪ {θ ′ } be a minimal unsatisfiable subset of Θ. (Remember, we are allowed to assume that Θ is finite.) Hence, Θ ′ is satisfiable, with Θ ′ |=θ ′ . By the previous argument,
Theorem 3.7. The derivation relation ⊢ S is sound and complete for S.
Proof. Soundness is obvious. Suppose that Θ is a satisfiable set of S-formulas and θ an S-formula such that Θ |= θ. By Theorem 3.6, Θ ⊢ S † θ. We must show that Θ ⊢ S θ. Since derivations (in ⊢ S † ) are finite, we may assume without loss of generality that Θ is finite. For the moment, let us further assume that Θ is satisfiable. Let p, q be any unary atoms. We claim that Θ |= ∀(p, q). For otherwise, by Lemma 3.2 Part 1, there exists a subset Φ ⊆ Θ of universal formulas such that Φ |= ∀(p, q). Now let A be any structure such that o A = ∅ for every unary atom o. Since Φ ⊆ S, A |= Φ; but A |= ∀(p, q), a contradiction. Furthermore, since ⊢ S † is sound, it follows of course that Θ ⊢ S † ∀(p, q).
Consider any derivation in ⊢ S † with premises Θ. We claim that, if this derivation contains any formula of the form ∃(p,q), then the final conclusion of this derivation is also of that form. For, since Θ is, by assumption, satisfiable, (X) cannot be used in the derivation; and the only other rules in S † with any premise of the form ∃(p,q) are (I) and (D), thus:
By the observation of the previous paragraph, the literal l in this instance of (D) must be negative. In either case, the consequent of the rule is of the form ∃(p,q), as claimed.
Now take any derivation of θ from Θ in ⊢ S † . (We know that one exists.) Since θ ∈ S is definitely not of the form ∃(p,q), it follows from the previous two paragraphs that this derivation cannot involve any formula of either of the forms ∀(p, q) or ∃(p,q). That is, all the formulas are in S. By Lemma 3.1,
This proves the theorem in the case where the (finite) set of S-formulas Θ is satisfiable. If Θ is unsatisfiable, let Θ ′ ∪ {θ ′ } be a minimal unsatisfiable subset of Θ. Hence, Θ ′ is satisfiable, with Θ ′ |=θ ′ . By the result just established, Θ ′ ⊢ Sθ ′ . By a single application of (X), Θ ⊢ S θ.
R: a refutation complete system
We turn from S to R. We exhibit a set R of syllogistic rules in R, and prove that ⊢ R is a sound and refutation-complete derivation relation for R; we also prove that there is no finite set of rules X in R such that X is sound and complete for R. This highlights the importance of (RAA) in obtaining complete logics. Our refutation-completeness proof also implies that the problem of determining whether a given R-sequent is valid is in NLogSpace, a fact which is otherwise not obvious.
4.1 There are no sound and complete syllogistic systems for R Theorem 4.1. There exists no finite set X of syllogistic rules in R such that ⊢ X is both sound and complete.
Proof. Let X be any finite set of syllogistic rules for R, and suppose ⊢ X is sound. We show that it is not complete. Since X is finite, fix n ∈ N greater than the number of antecedents in any rule in X.
Let p 1 , . . . , p n be distinct unary atoms and r a binary atom. Let Γ be the following set of R-formulas:
and let γ be the R-formula ∀(p 1 , ∃(p n , r)). Observe that Γ |= γ. To see this, let
It follows from this claim that Γ ⊢ X γ. For, since no rule of X has more than n − 1 antecedents, any instance of those antecedents contained in Γ must be contained in ∆ i for some i. Let δ be the corresponding instance of the consequent of that rule. Since ⊢ X is sound, ∆ i |= δ. By Claim 4.2, δ ∈ Γ. By induction on the number of steps in derivations, we see that no derivation from Γ leads to a formula not in Γ. But γ ∈ Γ.
Proof of Claim. Certainly, ∆ i has a model, for instance the model A i given by:
Here, A = {p 1 , . . . , p n }, p
Ai j = {p j } for all j (1 j n), and r Ai is indicated by the arrows. All other atoms (unary or binary) are assumed to have empty extensions. Note that there is no arrow from p i to p i+1 .
We consider the various possibilities for ϕ in turn and check that either ϕ ∈ Γ or there is a model of ∆ i in which ϕ is false.
(i) ϕ is of the form ∀(p, p). Then ϕ ∈ Γ by (23).
(ii) ϕ is not of the form ∀(p, p), and involves at least one unary or binary atom other than p 1 , . . . , p n , r. In this case, it is straightforward to modify A i so as to obtain a model
Henceforth, then, we may assume that ϕ involves no atoms other than p 1 , . . . , p n , r.
(v) ϕ is of the form ∀(p j , ∀(p k , r)). If j = 1 and k = n, then ϕ ∈ Γ, by (22). So we may assume that either j > 1 or k < n, in which case, k = j + 1 implies A i |= ϕ, by inspection. Hence, we may assume that ϕ = ∀(p j , ∀(p j+1 , r)), with j < n. Let B i,j be the structure obtained from A i by adding a second point b to the interpretation of p j+1 , and to which p j is not related by r. In pictures:
(This picture shows j + 2 < i. Similar pictures are possible in all other cases.) By inspection, B i,j |= ∆ i , but B i,j |= ϕ.
(vi) ϕ is of the form ∀(p j , ∃(p k , r)). If k = j + 1, then ϕ ∈ Γ, by (21). Moreover, if k = j + 1, then, unless j = 1 and k = n, A i |= ϕ, by inspection. Hence we may assume ϕ = ∀(p 1 , ∃(p n , r)). Let C i be the structure:
(viii) ϕ is of the form ∃(p, c). Let A 0 be a structure over any domain in which every atom has empty extension. Then A 0 |= ∆ i , but A 0 |= ϕ.
This also completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
4.2 A refutation-complete system for R Theorem 4.1 notwithstanding, we exhibit below a finite set R of rules in R, such that ⊢ R is sound and refutation-complete. We remind the reader that p and q range over unary atoms, c over c-terms, and t over binary literals.
Rules (D1), (D2), (D3), (B), (A), (T) and (I) are natural generalizations of their namesakes in S. In contrast, (∀∀), (∃∃), (∀∃) and (II) express genuinely relational logical principles. In some settings, these last rules are called monotonicity principles. Because we seek only refutation-completeness for ⊢ R , we do not need a version of the rule (X).
To illustrate these rules, let n be any integer greater than 1, let
, we have the derivation (shown here for n > 3)
. . .
showing that Γ * ∪ {γ} ⊢ R ⊥. By contrast, since Γ * ⊆ Γ, where Γ is the set of formulas used in the proof of Theorem 4.1, we know that, for any finite set X of syllogistic rules, n can be made sufficiently large that Γ * ⊢ X γ.
Starting on the proof For the remainder of this section, fix a finite, nonempty set Γ of R-formulas. As usual, we take the (possibly decorated) variables p, q to range over unary atoms, r over binary atoms, t over binary literals, and c, d over c-terms. We write c ⇒ d if c = d or there exists a sequence of unary
Lemma 4.3. Let V be a set of c-terms.
Proof. Almost immediate, noting that R contains the rules (B) and (T).
In the ensuing lemmas, we show that, if Γ is consistent (with respect to ⊢ R ), then Γ is satisfiable. As a first step, we create plenty of objects from which to 
Proof.
We now define sets B 1 , B 2 , . . . inductively as follows. Suppose B k has been defined. Let Proof. Let k be the smallest number such that b S,i ∈ B k . We proceed by induction on k.
For the case k = 0, we have b V,i = b V,0 ∈ B 0 . By Lemma 4.3 Part 2, there exists q 1 ∈ S such that Γ ⊢ R ∀(q 1 , p). By Lemma 4.3 Part 1, either c ∈ V or there exists q 2 ∈ V such that Γ ⊢ R ∀(q 2 , c). In the former case, Lemma 4.4 yields Γ ⊢ R ∃(q 1 , c), so that we have the derivation . . . . 1 , c) . . . .
∃(q
In the latter case, Lemma 4.4 yields Γ ⊢ R ∃(q 1 , q 2 ), so that we have the derivation . . . . 1 , q 2 ) . . . .
For the case k > 0, b V,i ∈ B k implies V = {p k } for some p k , and 1 i 2. By construction of B k , there exist b W,j ∈ B k−1 , p k−1 ∈ W and binary atom r, such that W ⇒ ∃(p k , r). By inductive hypothesis, Γ ⊢ R ∃(p k−1 , ∃(p k , r)), and by Lemma 4.3 Part 3, Γ ⊢ R ∀(p k , p), and Γ ⊢ R ∀(p k , c). Therefore, we have the derivation . . . .
. . . . The set B will form the domain of a structure B, defined as follows. If p is a unary atom, set
and if r is a binary atom, set
The intuition is that the elements b {p},1 are witnesses for the existential quantifiers in c-terms of the form ∃(p, r), while the elements b {p},2 are witnesses for the existential quantifiers in c-terms of the form ∃(p,r). We now prove the main Lemma, from which both the complexity and the refutation-completeness results follow. If c = ∀(q, r), then, since V ⇒ c, the construction of B ensures that, for any b W,j ∈ q B , we have W ⇒ q and hence
Therefore, c is of one of the formsq, ∃(q,r), or ∀(q,r). We consider each possibility in turn, and show that one of the four cases of Condition (C) holds.
If c =q, then b V,i ∈ c B means that b V,i ∈ q B , so that, by construction of B, V ⇒ q. But by assumption, V ⇒ c, and we have Case 1 of Condition (C). Proof. For the implication 1 ⇒ 2, we observe that ⊢ R is obviously sound. The implication 2 ⇒ 3 is Lemma 4.8. For the implication 3 ⇒ 1, suppose Condition (C) of Lemma 4.8 holds. This condition has four cases: we consider each in turn, showing that Γ ⊢ R ∃(p,p) for some unary atom p. In Case (i), we then have . . . .
∃(p, ∃(q,r))
∀(q, o) ∃(p, ∃(o,r)) (∃∃)
while in Case (ii), we have . . . .
∃(p, ∀(o, r))
∀(p, ∃(q,r))
. . . . (p 2 ,ū) ) . . . . Proof. Soundness is obvious. Refutation-completeness is the implication from 2 to 1 in Lemma 4.9.
∀(p, ∀
∃(p 1 , p 2 ) ∀(p, ∃(p 1 ,ū)) (∀∀) . . . . ∃(p, ∀(p 1 , u)) ∃(p,p) (D3).
Theorem 4.11. The problem of determining the validity of a sequent in any of the fragments S, S
† and R is NLogSpace-complete.
Proof. The lower bound is obtained by reduction of the reachability problem for directed graphs to the validity problem for S. If G = (V, E) is a directed graph, take the nodes V to be unary atoms.
It is easy to check that Θ G |= ∀(u, v) if and only if v reachable from u.
Recall that, by the Immerman-Szelepcsényi Theorem, NLogSpace is closed under complementation. The upper bound for S † is then immediate, since the problem of determining the satisfiability of a given set of S † -formulas is (almost trivially) reducible to the problem 2SAT, which is well known to be NLogSpace-complete. (See, for example, Papadimitriou [16] , pp. 185 and 398.)
It remains only to establish the upper bound for R. For this, it suffices to show that the problem of determining the unsatisfiability of a given set Γ of R-formulas is in NLogSpace. Let Γ be a set of R-formulas. Let B and B be as defined for Lemmas 4.4-4.9. Lemma 4.9 guarantees that Γ is unsatisfiable if and only if there exist b S,i , b T,j ∈ B, unary atoms q, o, and a binary atom r satisfying one of the four cases in Condition (C) of Lemma 4.8. Nondeterministically guess these V , W , i, j, q, o and r. This requires only logarithmic space, because only the indices of the relevant atoms need to be encoded, and the size of B is linear in the number of formulas in Γ. To check that b V,i , b W,j ∈ B is essentially a graphreachability problem, as are all the requirements in the four cases of Condition (C). Since graph reachability is in NLogSpace, this proves the theorem.
R * : an indirect system
Next, we consider the fragment R * . We refer the reader to Figure 2 for a review of the syntax of this fragment. The complexity-theoretic analysis of R * has been done for us. It is contained in the more expressive logic (also inspired by natural language syntax) investigated in McAllester and Givan [10] Let R * be the following set of syllogistic rules in R * . Our result is that the indirect derivation relation R * is complete. In the following, the variables b + , c + range over positive c-terms, and d over c-terms. (As usual, p, q range over unary atoms and r over binary atoms.)
Rules (D1), (D2), (B), (T) and (I) are natural generalizations of their namesakes in R. Rules (J), (K), and (L) embody logical principles that are intuitively clear, yet not familiar when taken as single steps. If all porcupines are brown animals, then everything which attacks all brown animals attacks all porcupines (J), and everything which photographs some porcupine photographs some brown animal (K). And if some porcupines are brown animals, then everything which caresses all porcupines caresses some brown animals (L). We have already seen (II). Rule (Z) tells that if there are no porcupines (say), then all farmers love all porcupines. Rule (W) tells us that under this same assumption, there is something which loves all porcupines (simply because we assume the universe is non-empty, and everything in it vacuously loves all porcupines). If we did not assume that the universe of a model is non-empty, then we would drop (W), and the completeness of the resulting system would be proved the same way.
All the rules of R are derivable in R * . For example, here is a proof of (A):
The rest of this section is devoted to a proof that R * is sound and complete for R * .
Starting the proof To prove completeness, we need only show that every consistent set Γ in the fragment R * is satisfiable. Also, by Lemma 2.2, we may assume that Γ is R * -complete. For the remainder of this section, fix some R * -complete set of formulas Γ which is consistent with respect to R * . We simplify our notation to write ⊢ for R * .
We shall construct a structure A and prove that it satisfies Γ. First, let C + be the set of positive c-terms. Then we define A by:
iff either (a) for some i, j, and q ∈ P, Γ ⊢ ∀(c i , ∀(q, r)) and Γ ⊢ ∀(d j , q); or else (b) Q 2 = ∃, and for some i and q ∈ P, d 1 = d 2 = q, and Γ ⊢ ∀(c i , ∃(q, r)).
Note that the set A is non-empty. For let p ∈ P. If Γ ⊢ ∃(p, p), then p, p, ∀ ∈ A. Otherwise, Γ ⊢ ∀(p,p), and so for all binary atoms r, Γ ⊢ ∃(∀(p, r), ∀(p, r)) by (W). Thus c, c, ∀ ∈ A, where c is ∀(p, r).
Proof. The result for c a unary atom is immediate. We often shall use the resulting fact that if Γ ⊢ ∃(p, p), then p A = ∅; it contains both p, p, ∀ and p, p, ∃ . The main work concerns c-terms of the form ∀(p, r) and ∃(p, r). We remark that all c-terms referred to in this proof are positive.
We begin with c = ∀(p, r).
A . By the semantics of our fragment, d 1 , d 2 , Q r A p, p, ∀ . By the structure of A, there are i and q giving the derivation from Γ as in the tree on the left below:
. . . . ∀(q, r)) . . . .
∀(d i ,
. . . . ∀(p, r) ). On the other hand, if Γ ⊢ ∃(p, p), we use the assumption that Γ is complete to assert that Γ ⊢ ∀(p,p). And then we have the derivation from Γ on the right above, for both j.
This shows that Γ
Conversely, fix i and suppose that Γ ⊢ ∀(d i , ∀(p, r)). We claim that d 1 , d 2 , Q belongs to ∀(p, r)
A . For this, take any b 1 , b 2 , Q ′ ∈ p A so that Γ ⊢ ∀(b j , p) for some j. (We are thus using b 1 and b 2 to range over positive c-terms, just as the c's and d's do.) Then p, i and j show that
A . We next prove the statement of our lemma for c = ∃(p, r).
We first consider case (a) in the definition of our structure A: there are i, j, and q so that Γ ⊢ ∀(d i , ∀(q, r)) and Γ ⊢ ∀(b j , q). We have
. We show the desired conclusion using a derivation from Γ:
This concludes the work in case (a). In case (b), Q ′ = ∃, there is some q ∈ P such that b 1 = b 2 = q, and for some i, Γ ⊢ ∀(d i , ∃(q, r)). Again we have Γ ⊢ ∀(q, p). So we have a derivation from Γ as follows:
At this point, we know that if r) ) for some i. We now verify the converse. Let d 1 , d 2 , Q ∈ A, and fix i such that d 2 ) . We thus have a derivation from Γ:
This goes to show that p, p, ∃ ∈ A. By the construction of A,
A . This completes the proof.
Proof. The proof is by cases on the various formula types in R * . Using the fact that formulas ∃(e, f ) and ∃(f, e) are identified, and similarly for ∀(ē,f ) and ∀(f, e), we may take all R * -formulas to have one of the forms:
where c + and d + range over positive c-terms. In the remainder of the proof, we omit the + -superscripts for clarity: i.e. c and d range over positive c-terms. Let ϕ ∈ Γ be ∀(c, d). Using (B) and Lemma 5.3, we see that 6 R † and R * † : no indirect systems
Our last fragments are R † and R * † . We open with some simple complexity results, showing that these fragments have no direct syllogistic proof-system which is both sound and refutation-complete. After this, we strengthen the result to show that there are no indirect syllogistic proof-systems, either. The proof of this negative result is similar to what we saw earlier in Theorem 4.1 for R, but the argument here is more intricate.
Lemma 6.1. The problem of determining the validity of a sequent in R
† is ExpTime-hard.
Proof. The logic K
U is the basic modal logic K together with an additional modality U (for "universal"), whose semantics are given by the standard relational (Kripke) semantics, plus |= w U ϕ if and only if |= w ′ ϕ for all worlds w ′ .
The satisfiability problem for K U is ExpTime-hard. (The proof is an easy adaptation of the corresponding result for propositional dynamic logic; see, e.g. Harel et al. [7] : 216 ff.) It suffices, therefore, to reduce this problem to satisfiability in R † . Let ϕ be a formula of K U . We first transform ϕ into an equisatisfiable set of formulas T ϕ ∪ S ϕ of firstorder logic; then we translate the formulas of T ϕ ∪ S ϕ into an equisatisfiable set of R † -formulas. To simplify the notation, we shall take unary atoms (in R † ) to be unary predicates (in first-order logic); similarly, we take binary atoms to do double duty as binary predicates. Let r and e be binary atoms. For any K U -formula ψ, let p ψ be a unary atom, and define the set of first-order formulas T ψ inductively as follows:
T p = ∅ (where p is a proposition letter)
Now let S ϕ be the collection of five first-order formulas
(Although the first formula looks like it has a redundant conjunct, we state it in this way only to make our work below a little easier.) We claim that the modal formula ϕ is satisfiable if and only if the set of first-order formulas T ϕ ∪ S ϕ is satisfiable. For let M be any (Kripke) model of ϕ over a frame (W, R). Define the first-order structure A with domain W , by setting r A = R, e A = A 2 , and p A ψ = {w | M |= w ψ}, for any subformula ψ of ϕ. It is then easy to check that A |= T ϕ ∪S ϕ . Conversely, suppose A |= T ϕ ∪S ϕ . We build a Kripke structure M over the frame (A, r A ) by setting, for any proposition letter o mentioned in ϕ, M |= a o if and only if a ∈ p A o . A straightforward structural induction establishes that for any subformula ψ of ϕ, M |= a ψ if and only if a ∈ p
Now, all of the formulas in T ϕ ∪ S ϕ are of one of the forms
Notice that formulas of the forms (27) and (28) translate (in the obvious sense) directly into the fragment R † ; those of form (29), by contrast, do not. The next step is to eliminate formulas of this last type.
Let o * be a new unary relation symbol. For θ ∈ T ϕ ∪ S ϕ of the form (29), let r θ be a new binary atom, and define R θ to be the set of formulas
which are all of the forms in (27) or (28). It is easy to check that R θ |= θ. and r θ as follows:
We check that
. Now let T * ϕ be the result of replacing all formulas θ in T ϕ of form (29) with the corresponding trio R θ . (The binary atoms r θ for the various θ are assumed to be distinct; however, the same unary atom o * can be used for all θ.) By the previous paragraph, T * ϕ ∪ S ϕ is satisfiable if and only if T ϕ ∪ S ϕ is satisfiable, and hence if and only if ϕ is satisfiable. But T * ϕ ∪ S ϕ is a set of formulas of the forms (27) and (28), and can evidently be translated into a set of R † -formulas satisfied in exactly the same structures. Moreover, this set can be computed in time bounded by a polynomial function of ϕ . This completes the reduction.
We note the following fact. (We omit a detailed proof, since subsequent developments do not hinge on this result.) Lemma 6.2. The problem of determining the validity of a sequent in R * † is in ExpTime.
Proof. Trivial adaptation of Pratt-Hartmann [17] , Theorem 3, which considers a fragment obtained by adding relative clauses to the relational syllogistic. Starting on the proof Let n 2; let o 1 , o 2 , o 3 , q 1 , q 2 , p 1 , . . . , p n be unary atoms, and r, s binary atoms; and let A (n) be the set {a 1 , . . . , a n , a
We take the structure A (n) , with domain A (n) , to be as depicted in Fig. 3 . Here, membership of an element in p A (n) (where p is any unary atom) is indicated by writing p in a box next to that element. The extensions of the binary atoms r and s are depicted similarly: we indicate that a pair of elements is in r A (n) by writing r next to an arrow between those elements (and likewise for s). The r-labelled arrow from the dotted box to the element u 2 is to be interpreted as follows: for any element a inside the dotted box, a, u 2 ∈ r A (n) . Thus, A (n) contains two 'r-chains' of elements satisfying, successively, p 1 , . . . , p n : the elements of the first chain additionally satisfy q 1 but not q 2 ; those of the second chain additionally satisfy q 2 but not q 1 . The terminal elements of the two r-chains are related, by s, to the elements v 1 and v 2 . There are also some additional 'out-lier' elements, which ensure the truth of various existential formulas in A: for example, u 1 ensures (together with u 0 ) the truth of ∃(o 1 , ∃(p 1 ,r)); u 2 ensures the truth of ∃(q 1 , q 2 ), and so on. In the sequel, we define structures containing additional elements, which make almost the same R * † -formulas true as A (n) . These latter structures will then be used to show that there can be no sound and complete indirect syllogistic system for R * or R * † . To avoid notational clutter, we drop the superscripts in A (n) (and in related constructions) where the value of n does not matter. By inspection, we have
A |= ∀(q 1 , ∀(q 1 ,r))
A |= ∀(q 2 , ∀(q 2 ,r)) (36)
For any structure C, denote by Th(C) the set of R † -formulas true in C, and denote by Th * (C) the set of R * † -formulas true in C. Recall that a set of formulas Φ is R † -complete (or R * † -complete) if, for every R † -formula (respectively, R * † -formula) ϕ, either ϕ ∈ Φ orφ ∈ Φ. Trivially, for any C, Th(C) is R † -complete, and Th * (C) is R * † -complete. Let γ be the R † -formula given by
Noting that o A 1 = {u 0 }, u 0 , a 1 ∈ r A , and a 1 ∈ q A 2 , we have A |= γ (i.e. γ ∈ Th(A)). Let Γ (n) be obtained from Th(A (n) ) by reversing the truth-value of γ, and similarly for Γ * (n) . That is:
Again, we drop the (n)-superscript when the value of n does not matter. Thus, Γ is R † -complete and Γ * is R * † -complete. i , depicted in Fig. 4 . We employ the same notational conventions as in Fig. 3 . In particular, the r-labelled arrows from the dotted boxes are to be interpreted as follows: for any element a inside either of the dotted boxes, a, u 2 ∈ r the value of n does not matter. The structure B i contains a copy of A, but has an additional r-chain whose elements satisfy both q 1 and q 2 ; notice, however, that this additional r-chain stops at the ith element.
We employ the following terminology. An existential formula is one of the form ∃(e, f ). If ϕ = ∃(e, f ) and C a structure, then a witness for C |= ϕ is any a ∈ C such that a ∈ e C and a ∈ f C . Now, we saw above that A |= γ; by contrast B i |=γ (γ is an existential formula, and u 5 is a witness). Let δ i be the R † -formula given by
We observed in (37) that A |= δ i . By contrast, B i |=δ i (δ i is an existential formula, and b i is a witness). However, it turns out that γ and δ i are the only differences between A and B i as far as R * † is concerned:
Proof. Since γ, δ i ,γ,δ i are all in R † , the first of these statements follows instantly from the second. We proceed, therefore, to establish the second statement.
We first prove the statement for the case i = 1. Notice that here, the third r-'chain' in B (n) 1 contains just one element, b 1 . Our initial goal, then, is to show that Th
The basic intuition is simple: on the one hand, we may check the cases n = 2 and n = 3 by brute force; on the other, we see from Fig. 4 that, once the ends of the first two r-chains are sufficiently distant from the elements u 5 and b 1 , extending those r-chains further will have no effect on the differences between the formulas made true in A (n) and B
1 . To make this idea rigorous, we first establish three simple claims. We employ the following terminology. An existential e-term is one of the form ∃(l, t). (As usual, l ranges over unary literals, and t over binary literals.) If e = ∃(l, t), C is a structure, and a ∈ C, then a witness for a ∈ e C is any b ∈ C such that b ∈ l C and a, b ∈ t C .
Claim 6.7. Let a be any element of A (n) (n 2), and e any e-term. Then a ∈ e Proof. We prove the only-if direction by induction on n. The if-direction then follows by considering the e-termē. The case n = 2 is checked by brute force. (We used a computer.) Assume the claim is true for n = m 2; we show that it is true for n = m + 1. Let a ∈ A (m+1) . For contradiction, suppose
. Then e is existential, and a ∈ e Proof. By induction on n. The cases n = 2 and n = 3 are checked by brute force. (We used a computer.) Note in passing that the condition that ϕ is not δ 1 is required for these cases. Suppose now the claim holds for n = m 3; we show that it holds for n = m + 1. If e is any e-term, letê be the result of replacing any occurrence of the unary atom p m+1 by the unary atom p m . Writing ϕ = ∃(e, f ), letφ = ∃(ê,f ). Note that, since m 3 and ϕ =δ 1 , we haveφ =δ 1 . The following facts are obvious (see Figs. 3 and 4) :
for all a ∈ A 0 |= ϕ, then there exists a ∈ A 0 such that a is a witness for A (n) |= ϕ.
Proof. Identical in structure to the proof of Claim 6.8.
We can now prove Lemma 6.6 in the case i = 1. Claim 6.7 shows that any existential formula true in A (n) is true in B
1 , and moreover, that if ϕ is an existential formula true in B (n) 1 but false in A (n) , then either either u 5 or b 1 is a witness. But these possibilities are ruled out-except in the cases ϕ =γ and ϕ =δ 1 -by Claims 6.8 and 6.9, respectively. Finally, if ϕ is universal (and not equal to γ or δ 1 ), thenφ is existential (and not equal toγ orδ 1 ). The foregoing analysis shows that A (n) and B (n) 1 agree on the truth value ofφ, hence on the truth value of ϕ.
We have thus proved the lemma for i = 1 and all values of n. Fix n 3, and consider now the structure B (n) 2 , which differs from B (n) 1 only in that the third r-chain has been extended from one to two elements. By inspection of Fig. 4 , the only effect on the set of sentences made true is to restore the truth of δ 1 and to falsify δ 2 . That is:
Proceeding in the same way, we have, for all i (1 i < n − 1),
This proves the lemma.
Fixing n > 3, for all i and j (1 < i < j < n) define
Again (n)-superscripts are omitted where possible for clarity.
than k applications of (RAA). By minimality of k, θ ∈ Γ (n) , and so, by the R † -completeness of Γ (n) ,θ ∈ Γ (n) . But then we can replace our original derivation of ofθ with a trivial derivation, so obtaining a derivation of ⊥ from Γ (n) with fewer than k applications of (RAA), a contradiction.
The upshot: unlike in the case of R * , the full power of reductio does not help with R † and R * † .
Relation to other work
Systems related to S and S † Modern treatments of the the syllogistic can all be traced back to Lukasiewicz [8] , where a logic is presented in which formulas of the forms (2) are treated as atoms in a propositional calculus. Lukasiewicz provides a collection of axiom-schemata which, together with the usual axioms of propositional logic, yields a complete proof-system for the resulting language (a strict superset of S). The completeness of this system was shown independently by Westerståhl [20] ; note that it differs from the syllogistic fragments considered in this paper, in that it is embedded within propositional logic. Other commentators, for example, Smiley [18] , Corcoran [2] and Martin [9] , objecting to Lukasiewicz' exegesis of Aristotle, provide proof-systems in the form of syllogistic rules similar to those of S, again proving completeness of their respective systems. These systems are not direct syllogistic systems, since they all employ reductio ad absurdum. Our emphasis on direct syllogistic systems, and especially the formulation of refutation-completeness is new, and motivated by the results we have obtained on relational extensions of the syllogistic. In addition, the authors mentioned above do not treat the fragment S † . The completeness of S itself appears as Theorem 6.2 in Moss [14] , where various fragments of S are also axiomatized. The completeness of S † is proved in Moss [12] , using a somewhat different treatment.
Systems related to R The first presentation of a complete proof-system for a fragment close to the relational syllogistic seems to be Nishihara, Morita, and Iwata [15] . This logic is in effect a relational version of Lukasiewicz', in that formulas roughly similar to those of the forms (6) are treated as atoms of a propositional calculus. The authors provide axiom-schemata which, together with the usual axioms of propositional logic, yield a complete proof-system for the language in question. Actually, the propositional atoms in this language are allowed to feature n-ary predicates for all n 1. However, the rather strange restrictions on quantifier-scope (existentials must always outscope universals), mean that this language is primarily of interest for atoms featuring only unary and binary predicates; these atoms (and their negations) then essentially correspond the formulas of our fragment R. We mention in passing that Nishihara et al.'s language includes individual constants; but in practice, this leads to no useful increase in expressive power, and we ignore this feature. Because it involves such an expressive fragment, which includes full propositional logic, their proof certainly yields no upper complexity bound comparable to that of Theorem 4.11.
A logic inspired by the system of Nishihara et al may be found in Moss [13] . Roughly speaking, that logic is the negation-free fragment of R, corresponding to sentence-forms involving the words some and all, but not no. However, it extends R in that it allows both readings of scope-ambiguous sentences. For example, a sentence like Every painter admires some artist has both a subject wide scope reading and a subject narrow scope reading. The fact that the subject wide scope reading of logically implies the subject narrow reading is then a rule of inference in Moss' system. No contradictions are possible in the system.
Moss [13] also analyses a syllogistic logic with negated nouns (not verbs) and only using All. So in our notation, its formulas are ∀(l, m) and ∀(l, ∀(m, r)), with l and m unary literals. In addition to rules we have seen, it uses the following additional rules which might be taken to be forms of the law of the excluded middle:
∀(n, ∀(q, r)) ∀(n, ∀(q, r)) ∀(p, ∀(q, r)) ∀(p, ∀(n, r)) ∀(p, ∀(n, r)) ∀(p, ∀(q, r)).
The system is completed by a rule with three premises:
∀(p, ∀(n, r)) ∀(o, ∀(q, r)) ∀(ō, ∀(n, r)) ∀(p, ∀(q, r)).
McAllester and Givan's fragment We have already had occasion to mention the results of McAllester and Givan [10] in connection with our fragment R * . McAllester and Givan present a "Montagovian syntax" for a first-order language over a signature of unary and binary predicates and individual constants, together with (what they call) its "quantifier-free" fragment. In fact, this latter fragment is like our fragment R * , except that its 'class-terms' (the equivalent of our c-terms) can be nested to arbitrary depth. Thus, in McAllester and Givan's language, the formula ∀(∃(∃(man, kill), kill), ∃(∃(animal, kill), kill)) expresses the proposition that, as de Morgan might have put it, he who kills one who kills a man kills one who kills an animal. However, the ability to embed c-terms to arbitrary depth is easily seen not to confer any essential increase in expressive power of sets of formulas, since deeply nested class-terms can always be 'defined out' by introducing new unary predicates. (This is reflected in the fact that the satisfiability problem for R * is no different from that of McAllester and Givan's fragment.) Interestingly, McAllester and Givan show that the satisfiability of a set Γ of R * -formulas can be determined in polynomial time if, for each class-term c occurring in Γ, Γ contains either the formula ∃(c, c) or the formula ∀(c,c). (Such formula sets are said to determine existentials).
McAllester and Givan provide a syllogistic-like system for this fragment, which is complete for sets of formulas which determine existentials.
A sub-fragment of the McAllester and Givan fragment was considered in Moss [13] . In our terms, the formulas would be of the forms ∀ (c, d) and ∃(c, d) , where c and d are class-terms of the forms p (an atom), ∃(c, r), or ∀(d, r). Thus the system lacks negation. The rules are versions of rules we have seen in Section 5: (T), (I), (B), (D), (J), (K), (L), and (II); it also employs a rule allowing for reasoning-by-cases, which is not a syllogistic rule in the sense of this paper. An informal example shows that the system allows non-trivial inferences, and inferences with more than one verb.
All porcupines are mammals All who respect all mammals respect all porcupines All who dislike all who respect all porcupines dislike all who respect all mammals.
Modern revivals of term logic In recent decades, various logicians have challenged the dominant paradigm of quantification-theory by seeking to rehabilitate term logic-essentially, the extension of the traditional presentation of the syllogistic to the case of polyadic relations (see, e.g. Sommers [19] , Englebretsen [5] ). Broadly, the strategy adopted by these term-logicians has been to stress the expressiveness of the new term-logical syntax, and its ability to represent all that is represented in quantificational logic. (For a very clear account, see, Michael Lockwood's Appendix G to Sommers [19] , pp. 426-456.) By adopting the new, term-logical framework-so goes the argument-we obtain a formal system with all the expressive power of first-order logic, but with the added (alleged) advantage of greater fidelity to the structure of natural language. The outlook of the present paper is rather different, however. True, the fragments considered here could be simply and elegantly expressed using the syntax of term-logic. The resulting formulas would exhibit only cosmetic differences to the syntax introduced in Section 2; and, of course, the associated proof-systems would be, modulo these cosmetic differences, unaffected. However, we have been at pains to stress the inexpressiveness of the fragments studied above, because with inexpressiveness comes low computational complexity. And from the point of view of computational complexity, the issue of the ruling syntactic régime-predicate logic or term logic-is immaterial.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the availability of syllogism-like proof-systems for various extensions of the traditional syllogistic, with special emphasis on the need for the rule of reductio ad absurdum; in addition, we have derived tight complexity bounds for all the logics investigated. These logics are: (i) S, which corresponds to the traditional syllogistic; (ii) S † , which extends S with negated nouns; (iii) R, which extends S with transitive verbs; (iv) R † , which extends S with both these constructions; (v) R * , which extends R by allowing subject noun phrases to contain relative clauses; and (vi) R * † , which extends R * with negated nouns. these systems, together with the familiar two-variable fragment of first-order logic, are shown in Figure 5 .
The associated table lists these fragments together with the results we obtained on the existence of syllogistic systems and the complexity of determining validity of sequents. Regarding the existence of syllogistic systems, we showed that: (i) S and S † both have sound and complete direct syllogistic systems (i.e. systems containing no rule of reductio ad absurdum); (ii) R has a sound and refutation-complete direct syllogistic system (i.e. one which becomes complete if reductio ad absurdum is allowed as a single, final step), but no sound and complete direct syllogistic system; (iii) R * has a sound and complete indirect syllogistic system (i.e. one allowing unrestricted use of reductio ad absurdum), but-unless PTime=NPTime-no sound and refutation-complete direct syllogistic system; (iv) neither R † nor R * † has even an indirect syllogistic system that is sound and complete. Regarding complexity, we showed that: (i) the problem of determining the validity of a sequent in any of S, S † or R is NLogSpacecomplete; (ii) the problem of determining the validity of a sequent in R * is co-NPTime-complete; (iii) the problem of determining the validity of a sequent in either of R † or R * † is ExpTime-complete.
